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Abstract
Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial ex-
amples, which can mislead classifiers by adding impercep-
tible perturbations. An intriguing property of adversarial
examples is their good transferability, making black-box at-
tacks feasible in real-world applications. Due to the threat
of adversarial attacks, many methods have been proposed
to improve the robustness. Several state-of-the-art defenses
are shown to be robust against transferable adversarial ex-
amples. In this paper, we propose a translation-invariant
attack method to generate more transferable adversarial ex-
amples against the defense models. By optimizing a pertur-
bation over an ensemble of translated images, the generated
adversarial example is less sensitive to the white-box model
being attacked and has better transferability. To improve
the efficiency of attacks, we further show that our method
can be implemented by convolving the gradient at the un-
translated image with a pre-defined kernel. Our method is
generally applicable to any gradient-based attack method.
Extensive experiments on the ImageNet dataset validate the
effectiveness of the proposed method. Our best attack fools
eight state-of-the-art defenses at an 82% success rate on av-
erage based only on the transferability, demonstrating the
insecurity of the current defense techniques.
1. Introduction
Despite the great success, deep neural networks have
been shown to be highly vulnerable to adversarial exam-
ples [3, 33, 10]. These maliciously generated adversar-
ial examples are indistinguishable from legitimate ones by
adding small perturbations, but make deep models produce
unreasonable predictions. The existence of adversarial ex-
amples, even in the physical world [15, 8, 2], has raised
concerns in security-sensitive applications, e.g., self-driving
cars, healthcare and finance.
∗Corresponding author.
Raw Image FGSM TI-FGSM
Figure 1. The adversarial examples generated by the fast gradient
sign method (FGSM) [10] and the proposed translation-invariant
FGSM (TI-FGSM) for the Inception v3 [32] model.
Attacking deep neural networks has drawn an increas-
ing attention since the generated adversarial examples can
serve as an important surrogate to evaluate the robustness
of different models [5] and improve the robustness [10, 20].
Several methods have been proposed to generate adversarial
examples with the knowledge of the gradient information of
a given model, such as fast gradient sign method [10], basic
iterative method [15], and Carlini & Wagner’s method [5],
which are known as white-box attacks. Moreover, it is
shown that adversarial examples have cross-model transfer-
ability [19], i.e., the adversarial examples crafted for one
model can fool a different model with a high probability.
The transferability enables practical black-box attacks to
real-world applications and induces serious security issues.
The threat of adversarial examples has motivated ex-
tensive research on building robust models or techniques
to defend against adversarial attacks. These include train-
ing with adversarial examples [10, 34, 20], image denois-
ing/transformation [18, 37, 11], theoretically-certified de-
fenses [26, 36], and others [24, 30, 28]. Although the non-
certified defenses have demonstrated robustness against
common attacks, they do so by causing obfuscated gradi-
ents, which can be easily circumvented by new attacks [1].
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Figure 2. Demonstration of the different discriminative regions of the defense models compared with normally trained models. We adopt
class activation mapping [39] to visualize the attention maps of three normally trained models—Inception v3 [32], Inception ResNet
v2 [31], ResNet 152 [12] and four defense models [34, 18, 37, 11]. These defense models rely on different discriminative regions for
predictions compared with normally trained models, which could affect the transferability of adversarial examples.
However, some of the defenses [34, 18, 37, 11] claim to
be resistant to transferable adversarial examples, making it
difficult to evade them by black-box attacks.
The resistance of the defense models against transferable
adversarial examples is largely due to the phenomenon that
the defenses make predictions based on different discrimi-
native regions compared with normally trained models. For
example, we show the attention maps of several normally
trained models and defense models in Fig. 2, to represent
the discriminative regions for their predictions. It can be
seen that the normally trained models have similar attention
maps while the defenses induce different attention maps. A
similar observation is also found in [35] that the gradients of
the defenses in the input space align well with human per-
ception, while those of normally trained models appear very
noisy. This phenomenon of the defenses is caused by either
training under different data distributions [34] or transform-
ing the inputs before classification [18, 37, 11]. For black-
box attacks based on the transferability [10, 19, 7], an adver-
sarial example is usually generated for a single input against
a white-box model. So the generated adversarial example is
highly correlated with the discriminative region or gradient
of the white-box model at the given input point, making it
hard to transfer to other defense models that depend on dif-
ferent regions for predictions. Therefore, the transferability
of adversarial examples is largely reduced to the defenses.
To mitigate the effect of different discriminative regions
between models and evade the defenses by transferable ad-
versarial examples, we propose a translation-invariant at-
tack method. In particular, we generate an adversarial ex-
ample for an ensemble of images composed of a legitimate
one and its translated versions. We expect that the resultant
adversarial example is less sensitive to the discriminative
region of the white-box model being attacked, and has a
higher probability to fool another black-box model with a
defense mechanism. However, to generate such a pertur-
bation, we need to calculate the gradients for all images in
the ensemble, which brings much more computations. To
improve the efficiency of our attacks, we further show that
our method can be implemented by convolving the gradient
at the untranslated image with a pre-defined kernel under a
mild assumption. By combining the proposed method with
any gradient-based attack method (e.g., fast gradient sign
method [10], etc.), we obtain more transferable adversarial
examples with similar computation complexity.
Extensive experiments on the ImageNet dataset [27]
demonstrate that the proposed translation-invariant attack
method helps to improve the success rates of black-box at-
tacks against the defense models by a large margin. Our best
attack reaches an average success rate of 82% to evade eight
state-of-the-art defenses based only on the transferability,
thus demonstrating the insecurity of the current defenses.
2. Related Work
Adversarial examples. Deep neural networks have been
shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples first in the
visual domain [33]. Then several methods are proposed to
generate adversarial examples for the purpose of high suc-
cess rates and minimal size of perturbations [10, 15, 5].
They also exist in the physical world [15, 8, 2]. Although
adversarial examples are recently crafted for many other do-
mains, we focus on image classification tasks in this paper.
Black-box attacks. Black-box adversaries have no ac-
cess to the model parameters or gradients. The transfer-
ability [19] of adversarial examples can be used to attack a
black-box model. Several methods [7, 38] have been pro-
posed to improve the transferability, which enable power-
ful black-box attacks. Besides the transfer-based black-box
attacks, there is another line of work that performs attacks
based on adaptive queries. For example, Papernot et al. [25]
use queries to distill the knowledge of the target model and
train a surrogate model. They therefore turn the black-
box attacks to the white-box attacks. Recent methods use
queries to estimate the gradient or the decision boundary of
the black-box model [6, 4] to generate adversarial examples.
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However, these methods usually require a large number of
queries, which is impractical in real-world applications. In
this paper, we resort to transfer-based black-box attacks.
Attacks for an ensemble of examples. An adversarial
perturbation can be generated for an ensemble of legitimate
examples. In [22], the universal perturbations are generated
for the entire data distribution, which can fool the models on
most of natural images. In [2], the adversarial perturbation
is optimized over a distribution of transformations, which
is similar to our method. The major difference between the
method in [2] and ours is three-fold. First, we want to gen-
erate transferable adversarial examples against the defense
models, while the authors in [2] propose to synthesize ro-
bust adversarial examples in the physical world. Second,
we only use the translation operation, while they use a lot
of transformations such as rotation, translation, addition of
noise, etc. Third, we develop an efficient algorithm for op-
timization that only needs to calculate the gradient for the
untranslated image, while they calculate the gradients for a
batch of transformed images by sampling.
Defend against adversarial attacks. A large variety of
methods have been proposed to increase the robustness of
deep learning models. Besides directly making the models
produce correct predictions for adversarial examples, some
methods attempt to detect them instead [21, 23]. How-
ever, most of the non-certified defenses demonstrate the
robustness by causing obfuscated gradients, which can be
successfully circumvented by new attacks [1]. Although
these defenses are not robust in the white-box setting, some
of them [34, 18, 37, 11] empirically show the resistance
against transferable adversarial examples in the black-box
setting. In this paper, we focus on generating more transfer-
able adversarial examples against these defenses.
3. Methodology
In this section, we provide the detailed description of
our algorithm. Let xreal denote a real example and y de-
note the corresponding ground-truth label. Given a classi-
fier f(x) : X → Y that outputs a label as the prediction for
an input, we want to generate an adversarial example xadv
which is visually indistinguishable from xreal but fools the
classifier, i.e., f(xadv) 6= y.1 In most cases, the Lp norm of
the adversarial perturbation is required to be smaller than a
threshold  as ||xadv − xreal||p ≤ . In this paper, we use
the L∞ norm as the measurement. For adversarial exam-
ple generation, the objective is to maximize the loss func-
tion J(xadv, y) of the classifier, where J is often the cross-
entropy loss. So the constrained optimization problem can
be written as
argmax
xadv
J(xadv, y), s.t. ‖xadv − xreal‖∞ ≤ . (1)
1This corresponds to untargeted attack. The method in this paper can
be simply extended to targeted attack.
To solve this optimization problem, the gradient of the loss
function with respect to the input needs to be calculated,
termed as white-box attacks. However, in some cases, we
cannot get access to the gradients of the classifier, where we
need to perform attacks in the black-box manner. We resort
to transferable adversarial examples which are generated for
a different white-box classifier but have high transferability
for black-box attacks.
3.1. Gradient-based Adversarial Attack Methods
Several methods have been proposed to solve the opti-
mization problem in Eq. (1). We give a brief introduction
of them in this section.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [10] generates an
adversarial example xadv by linearizing the loss function in
the input space and performing one-step update as
xadv = xreal +  · sign(∇xJ(xreal, y)), (2)
where ∇xJ is the gradient of the loss function with respect
to x. sign(·) is the sign function to make the perturba-
tion meet the L∞ norm bound. FGSM can generate more
transferable adversarial examples but is usually not effec-
tive enough for attacking white-box models [16].
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [15] extends FGSM by
iteratively applying gradient updates multiple times with a
small step size α, which can be expressed as
xadvt+1 = x
adv
t + α · sign(∇xJ(xadvt , y)), (3)
where xadv0 = x
real. To restrict the generated adversarial
examples within the -ball of xreal, we can clip xadvt after
each update, or set α = /T , with T being the number of
iterations. It has been shown that BIM induces much more
powerful white-box attacks than FGSM at the cost of worse
transferability [16, 7].
Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method
(MI-FGSM) [7] proposes to improve the transferability of
adversarial examples by integrating a momentum term into
the iterative attack method. The update procedure is
gt+1 = µ · gt + ∇xJ(x
adv
t , y)
‖∇xJ(xadvt , y)‖1
, (4)
xadvt+1 = x
adv
t + α · sign(gt+1), (5)
where gt gathers the gradient information up to the t-th it-
eration with a decay factor µ.
Diverse Inputs Method [38] applies random transfor-
mations to the inputs and feeds the transformed images into
the classifier for gradient calculation. The transformation
includes random resizing and padding with a given proba-
bility. This method can be combined with the momentum-
based method to further improve the transferability.
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Carlini & Wagner’s method (C&W) [5] is a powerful
optimization-based method, which solves
argmin
xadv
‖xadv − xreal‖p − c · J(xadv, y), (6)
where the loss function J could be different from the cross-
entropy loss. This method aims to find adversarial examples
with minimal size of perturbations, to measure the robust-
ness of different models. It also lacks the effectiveness for
black-box attacks like BIM.
3.2. Translation-Invariant Attack Method
Although many attack methods [7, 38] can generate ad-
versarial examples with very high transferability across nor-
mally trained models, they are less effective to attack de-
fense models in the black-box manner. Some of the de-
fenses [34, 18, 37, 11] are shown to be quite robust against
black-box attacks. So we want to answer that: Are these de-
fenses really free from transferable adversarial examples?
We find that the discriminative regions used by the de-
fenses to identify object categories are different from those
used by normally trained models, as shown in Fig. 2. When
generating an adversarial example by the methods intro-
duced in Sec. 3.1, the adversarial example is only optimized
for a single legitimate example. So it may be highly corre-
lated with the discriminative region or gradient of the white-
box model being attacked at the input data point. For other
black-box defense models that have different discriminative
regions or gradients, the adversarial example can hardly re-
main adversarial. Therefore, the defenses are shown to be
robust against transferable adversarial examples.
To generate adversarial examples that are less sensitive
to the discriminative regions of the white-box model, we
propose a translation-invariant attack method. In partic-
ular, rather than optimizing the objective function at a single
point as Eq. (1), the proposed method uses a set of translated
images to optimize an adversarial example as
argmax
xadv
∑
i,j
wijJ(Tij(x
adv), y),
s.t. ‖xadv − xreal‖∞ ≤ ,
(7)
where Tij(x) is the translation operation that shifts image
x by i and j pixels along the two-dimensions respectively,
i.e., each pixel (a, b) of the translated image is Tij(x)a,b =
xa−i,b−j , andwij is the weight for the loss J(Tij(xadv), y).
We set i, j ∈ {−k, ..., 0, ..., k} with k being the maximal
number of pixels to shift. With this method, the generated
adversarial examples are less sensitive to the discriminative
regions of the white-box model being attacked, which may
be transferred to another model with a higher success rate.
We choose the translation operation in this paper rather than
other transformations (e.g., rotation, scaling, etc.), because
we can develop an efficient algorithm to calculate the gradi-
ent of the loss function by the assumption of the translation-
invariance [17] in convolutional neural networks.
3.2.1 Gradient Calculation
To solve the optimization problem in Eq. (7), we need to
calculate the gradients for (2k + 1)2 images, which intro-
duces much more computations. Sampling a small number
of translated images for gradient calculation is a feasible
way [2]. But we show that we can calculate the gradient for
only one image under a mild assumption.
Convolutional neural networks are supposed to have the
translation-invariant property [17], that an object in the in-
put can be recognized in spite of its position. In practice,
CNNs are not truly translation-invariant [9, 14]. So we
make an assumption that the translation-invariant property
is nearly held with very small translations (which is empiri-
cally validated in Sec. 4.2). In our problem, we shift the im-
age by no more than 10 pixels along each dimension (i.e.,
k ≤ 10). Therefore, based on this assumption, the trans-
lated image Tij(x) is almost the same as x as inputs to the
models, as well as their gradients
∇xJ(x, y)
∣∣
x=Tij(xˆ)
≈ ∇xJ(x, y)
∣∣
x=xˆ
. (8)
We then calculate the gradient of the loss function defined
in Eq. (7) at a point xˆ as
∇x
(∑
i,j
wijJ(Tij(x), y)
)∣∣
x=xˆ
=
∑
i,j
wij∇xJ(Tij(x), y)
∣∣
x=xˆ
=
∑
i,j
wij
(∇Tij(x)J(Tij(x), y) · ∂Tij(x)∂x )∣∣∣x=xˆ
=
∑
i,j
wijT−i−j
(∇xJ(x, y)∣∣x=Tij(xˆ))
≈
∑
i,j
wijT−i−j(∇xJ(x, y)
∣∣
x=xˆ
).
(9)
Given Eq. (9), we do not need to calculate the gradients for
(2k+1)2 images. Instead, we only need to get the gradient
at the untranslated image xˆ and then average all the shifted
gradients. This procedure is equivalent to convolving the
gradient with a kernel composed of all the weights wij as∑
i,j
wijT−i−j(∇xJ(x, y)
∣∣
x=xˆ
)⇔W ∗ ∇xJ(x, y)
∣∣
x=xˆ
,
where W is the kernel matrix of size (2k + 1)× (2k + 1),
withWi,j = w−i−j . We will specifyW in the next section.
3.2.2 Kernel Matrix
There are many options to generate the kernel matrix W . A
basic design principle is that the images with bigger shifts
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should have relatively lower weights to make the adversarial
perturbation fool the model at the untranslated image effec-
tively. In this paper, we consider three different choices:
(1) A uniform kernel that Wi,j = 1/(2k+1)2;
(2) A linear kernel that W˜i,j = (1− |i|/k+1) · (1− |j|/k+1),
and Wi,j = W˜i,j/
∑
i,j W˜i,j;
(3) A Gaussian kernel that W˜i,j = 12piσ2 exp(− i
2+j2
2σ2 )
where the standard deviation σ = k/√3 to make the
radius of the kernel be 3σ, and Wi,j = W˜i,j/
∑
i,j W˜i,j .
We will empirically compare the three kernels in Sec. 4.3.
3.2.3 Attack Algorithms
Note that in Sec. 3.2.1, we only illustrate how to calculate
the gradient of the loss function defined in Eq. (7), but do
not specify the update algorithm for generating adversar-
ial examples. This indicates that our method can be inte-
grated into any gradient-based attack method, e.g., FGSM,
BIM, MI-FGSM, etc. For gradient-based attack methods
presented in Sec. 3.1, in each step we calculate the gradient
∇xJ(xadvt , y) at the current solution xadvt , then convolve
the gradient with the pre-defined kernel W , and finally ob-
tain the new solution xadvt+1 following the update rule in dif-
ferent attack methods. For example, the combination of
our translation-invariant method and the fast gradient sign
method [10] (TI-FGSM) has the following update rule
xadv = xreal +  · sign(W ∗ ∇xJ(xreal, y)). (10)
Also, the integration of the translation-invariant method into
the basic iterative method [15] yields the TI-BIM algorithm
xadvt+1 = x
adv
t + α · sign(W ∗ ∇xJ(xadvt , y)). (11)
The translation-invariant method can be similarly integrated
into MI-FGSM [7] and DIM [38] as TI-MI-FGSM and TI-
DIM, respectively.
4. Experiments
In this section, we present the experimental results to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. We
first specify the experimental settings in Sec. 4.1. Then we
validate the translation-invariant property of convolutional
neural networks in Sec. 4.2. We further conduct two exper-
iments to study the effects of different kernels and size of
kernels in Sec. 4.3 and Sec. 4.4. We finally compare the
results of the proposed method with baseline methods in
Sec. 4.5 and Sec. 4.6.
4.1. Experimental Settings
We use an ImageNet-compatible dataset2 comprised of
1,000 images to conduct experiments. This dataset was used
2https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans/tree/
master/examples/nips17_adversarial_competition/
dataset
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Figure 3. We show the loss surfaces of Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2,
and Res-v2-152 given the translated images at each position.
in the NIPS 2017 adversarial competition. We include eight
defense models which are shown to be robust against black-
box attacks on the ImageNet dataset. These are
• Inc-v3ens3, Inc-v3ens4, IncRes-v2ens [34];
• high-level representation guided denoiser (HGD, rank-
1 submission in the NIPS 2017 defense competi-
tion) [18];
• input transformation through random resizing and
padding (R&P, rank-2 submission in the NIPS 2017
defense competition) [37];
• input transformation through JPEG compression or to-
tal variance minimization (TVM) [11];
• rank-3 submission3 in the NIPS 2017 defense compe-
tition (NIPS-r3).
To attack these defenses based on the transferability, we
also include four normally trained models—Inception v3
(Inc-v3) [32], Inception v4 (Inc-v4), Inception ResNet v2
(IncRes-v2) [31], and ResNet v2-152 (Res-v2-152) [13], as
the white-box models to generate adversarial examples.
In our experiments, we integrate our method into the
fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [10], momentum iter-
ative fast gradient sign method (MI-FGSM) [7], and di-
verse inputs method (DIM) [38]. We do not include the
basic iterative method [15] and C&W’s method [5] since
that they are not good at generating transferable adversarial
examples [7]. We denote the attacks combined with our
translation-invariant method as TI-FGSM, TI-MI-FGSM,
and TI-DIM, respectively.
For the settings of hyper-parameters, we set the maxi-
mum perturbation to be  = 16 among all experiments with
pixel values in [0, 255]. For the iterative attack methods,
we set the number of iteration as 10 and the step size as
α = 1.6. For MI-FGSM and TI-MI-FGSM, we adopt the
default decay factor µ = 1.0. For DIM and TI-DIM, the
3https://github.com/anlthms/nips-2017/tree/
master/mmd
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Attack Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens HGD R&P JPEG TVM NIPS-r3
TI-FGSM
Uniform 25.0 27.9 21.1 15.7 19.1 24.8 32.3 21.9
Linear 30.7 32.4 24.2 20.9 23.3 28.1 34.6 25.8
Gaussian 28.2 28.9 22.3 18.4 19.8 25.5 30.7 24.5
TI-MI-FGSM
Uniform 30.0 32.2 22.8 21.7 22.8 26.4 32.7 25.9
Linear 35.8 35.0 26.8 25.5 23.4 29.0 35.8 27.5
Gaussian 35.8 35.1 25.8 25.7 23.9 28.2 34.9 26.7
TI-DIM
Uniform 32.6 34.6 25.6 24.1 27.2 30.2 34.9 28.8
Linear 45.2 47.0 34.9 35.6 35.2 38.5 43.6 39.7
Gaussian 46.9 47.1 37.4 38.3 36.8 37.0 44.2 41.4
Table 1. The success rates (%) of black-box attacks against eight defenses with different choices of kernels. The adversarial examples are
crafted for Inc-v3 by TI-FGSM, TI-MI-FGSM and TI-DIM with the uniform kernel, the linear kernel, and the Gaussian kernel, respectively.
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Figure 4. The success rates (%) of black-box attacks against IncRes-v2ens, HGD, R&P, TVM, and NIPS-r3. The adversarial examples are
generated for Inc-v3 with the kernel length ranging from 1 to 21.
transformation probability is set to 0.7. Please note that the
settings for each attack method and its translation-invariant
version are the same, because our method is not concerned
with the specific attack procedure.
4.2. Translation-Invariant Property of CNNs
We first verify the translation-invariant property of con-
volutional neural networks in this section. We use the orig-
inal 1,000 images from the dataset and shift them by −10
to 10 pixels in each dimension. We input the original im-
ages as well as the translated images into Inc-v3, Inc-v4,
IncRes-v2, and Res-v2-152, respectively. The loss of each
input image is given by the models. We average the loss
over all translated images at each position, and show the
loss surfaces in Fig. 3.
It can be seen that the loss surfaces are generally smooth
with the translations going from −10 to 10 in each dimen-
sion. So we could make the assumption that the translation-
invariant property is almost held within a small range. In
our attacks, the images are shifted by no more than 10 pix-
els along each dimension. The loss values would be very
similar for the original and translated images. Therefore,
we regard that a translated image is almost the same as the
corresponding original image as inputs to the models.
4.3. The Results of Different Kernels
In the section, we show the experimental results of the
proposed translation-invariant attack method with different
choices of kernels. We attack the Inc-v3 model by TI-
FGSM, TI-MI-FGSM, and TI-DIM with three types of ker-
nels, i.e., uniform kernel, linear kernel, and Gaussian ker-
nel, as introduced in Sec. 3.2.2. In Table 1, we report the
success rates of black-box attacks against the eight defense
models we study, where the success rates are the misclassi-
fication rates of the corresponding defense models with the
generated adversarial images as inputs.
We can see that for TI-FGSM, the linear kernel leads to
better results than the uniform kernel and the Gaussian ker-
nel. And for more powerful attacks such as TI-MI-FGSM
and TI-DIM, the Gaussian kernel achieves similar or even
better results than the linear kernel. However, both of the
linear kernel and the Gaussian kernel are more effective
than the uniform kernel. It indicates that we should design
the kernel that has lower weights for bigger shifts, as dis-
cussed in Sec. 3.2.2. We simply adopt the Gaussian kernel
in the following experiments.
4.4. The Effect of Kernel Size
The size of the kernel W also plays a key role for im-
proving the success rates of black-box attacks. If the kernel
size equals to 1 × 1, the translation-invariant based attacks
degenerate to their vanilla versions. Therefore, we conduct
an ablation study to examine the effect of kernel sizes.
We attack the Inc-v3 model by TI-FGSM, TI-MI-FGSM,
and TI-DIM with the Gaussian kernel, whose length ranges
from 1 to 21with a granularity 2. In Fig. 4, we show the suc-
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Attack Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens HGD R&P JPEG TVM NIPS-r3
Inc-v3 FGSM 15.6 14.7 7.0 2.1 6.5 19.9 18.8 9.8TI-FGSM 28.2 28.9 22.3 18.4 19.8 25.5 30.7 24.5
Inc-v4 FGSM 16.2 16.1 9.0 2.6 7.9 21.8 19.9 11.5TI-FGSM 28.2 28.3 21.4 18.1 21.6 27.9 31.8 24.6
IncRes-v2 FGSM 18.0 17.2 10.2 3.9 9.9 24.7 23.4 13.3TI-FGSM 32.8 33.6 28.1 25.4 28.1 32.4 38.5 31.4
Res-v2-152 FGSM 20.2 17.7 9.9 3.6 8.6 24.0 22.0 12.5TI-FGSM 34.6 34.5 27.8 24.4 27.4 32.7 38.1 30.1
Table 2. The success rates (%) of black-box attacks against eight defenses. The adversarial examples are crafted for Inc-v3, Inc-v4,
IncRes-v2, and Res-v2-152 respectively using FGSM and TI-FGSM.
Attack Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens HGD R&P JPEG TVM NIPS-r3
Inc-v3 MI-FGSM 20.5 17.4 9.5 6.9 8.7 20.3 19.4 12.9TI-MI-FGSM 35.8 35.1 25.8 25.7 23.9 28.2 34.9 26.7
Inc-v4 MI-FGSM 22.1 20.1 12.1 9.6 12.1 26.0 24.8 15.6TI-MI-FGSM 36.7 39.2 28.7 27.8 28.0 31.6 38.4 29.5
IncRes-v2 MI-FGSM 31.3 27.2 19.7 19.6 18.6 31.6 34.4 22.7TI-MI-FGSM 50.7 51.7 49.3 45.1 45.2 45.9 55.4 46.2
Res-v2-152 MI-FGSM 25.1 23.7 13.3 15.1 14.6 31.2 24.5 18.0TI-MI-FGSM 39.9 37.7 32.8 31.8 31.1 38.3 41.2 34.4
Table 3. The success rates (%) of black-box attacks against eight defenses. The adversarial examples are crafted for Inc-v3, Inc-v4,
IncRes-v2, and Res-v2-152 respectively using MI-FGSM and TI-MI-FGSM.
Kernel Length=1 Kernel Length=3 Kernel Length=5 Kernel Length=7 Kernel Length=9 Kernel Length=11 Kernel Length=13 Kernel Length=15
Figure 5. The adversarial examples generated for Inc-v3 by TI-FGSM with different kernel sizes.
cess rates against five defense models—IncRes-v2ens, HGD,
R&P, TVM, and NIPS-r3. The success rate continues in-
creasing at first, and turns to remain stable after the kernel
size exceeds 15× 15. Therefore, the size of the kernel is set
to 15× 15 in the following.
We also show the adversarial images generated for the
Inc-v3 model by TI-FGSM with different kernel sizes in
Fig. 5. Due to the smooth effect given by the kernel, we
can see that the adversarial perturbations are smoother when
using a bigger kernel.
4.5. Single-Model Attacks
In this section, we compare the black-box success rates
of the translation-invariant based attacks with baseline at-
tacks. We first perform adversarial attacks for Inc-v3, Inc-
v4, IncRes-v2, and Res-v2-152 respectively using FGSM,
MI-FGSM, DIM, and their extensions by combining with
the translation-invariant attack method as TI-FGSM, TI-MI-
FGSM, and TI-DIM. We adopt the 15×15 Gaussian kernel
in this set of experiments. We then use the generated ad-
versarial examples to attack the eight defense models we
consider based only on the transferability. We report the
success rates of black-box attacks in Table 2 for FGSM and
TI-FGSM, Table 3 for MI-FGSM and TI-MI-FGSM, and
Table 4 for DIM and TI-DIM.
From the tables, we observe that the success rates against
the defenses are improved by a large margin when using
the proposed method regardless of the attack algorithms
or the white-box models being attacked. In general, the
translation-invariant based attacks consistently outperform
the baseline attacks by 5% ∼ 30%. In particular, when us-
ing TI-DIM, the combination of our method and DIM, to
attack the IncRes-v2 model, the resultant adversarial exam-
ples have about 60% success rates against the defenses (as
shown in Table 4). It demonstrates the vulnerability of the
current defenses against black-box attacks. The results also
validate the effectiveness of the proposed method. Although
we only compare the results of our attack method with base-
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Attack Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens HGD R&P JPEG TVM NIPS-r3
Inc-v3 DIM 24.2 24.3 13.0 9.7 13.3 30.7 24.4 18.0TI-DIM 46.9 47.1 37.4 38.3 36.8 37.0 44.2 41.4
Inc-v4 DIM 28.3 27.5 15.6 14.6 17.2 38.6 29.1 14.1TI-DIM 48.6 47.5 38.7 40.3 39.3 43.5 45.6 41.9
IncRes-v2 DIM 41.2 40.0 27.9 32.4 30.2 47.2 41.7 37.6TI-DIM 61.3 60.1 59.5 58.7 61.4 55.7 66.2 61.5
Res-v2-152 DIM 40.5 36.0 24.1 32.6 26.4 42.4 36.8 34.4TI-DIM 56.1 55.5 49.5 51.8 50.4 50.8 55.7 52.9
Table 4. The success rates (%) of black-box attacks against eight defenses. The adversarial examples are crafted for Inc-v3, Inc-v4,
IncRes-v2, and Res-v2-152 respectively using DIM and TI-DIM.
Attack Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens HGD R&P JPEG TVM NIPS-r3
FGSM 27.5 23.7 13.4 4.9 13.8 38.1 30.0 19.8
TI-FGSM 39.1 38.8 31.6 29.9 31.2 43.3 39.8 33.9
MI-FGSM 50.5 48.3 32.8 38.6 32.8 67.7 50.1 43.9
TI-MI-FGSM 76.4 74.4 69.6 73.3 68.3 77.2 72.1 71.4
DIM 66.0 63.3 45.9 57.7 51.7 82.5 64.1 63.7
TI-DIM 84.8 82.7 78.0 82.6 81.4 83.4 79.8 83.1
Table 5. The success rates (%) of black-box attacks against eight defenses. The adversarial examples are crafted for the ensemble of Inc-v3,
Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, and Res-v2-152 using FGSM, TI-FGSM, MI-FGSM, TI-MI-FGSM, DIM, and TI-DIM.
line methods against the defense models, our attacks remain
the success rates of baseline attacks in the white-box setting
and the black-box setting against normally trained models,
which will be shown in the Appendix.
We show two adversarial images generated for the Inc-v3
model by FGSM and TI-FGSM in Fig. 1. It can be seen that
by using TI-FGSM, in which the gradients are convolved by
a kernel W before applying to the raw images, the adver-
sarial perturbations are much smoother than those generated
by FGSM. The smooth effect also exists in other translation-
invariant based attacks.
4.6. Ensemble-based Attacks
In this section, we further present the results when adver-
sarial examples are generated for an ensemble of models.
Liu et al. [19] have shown that attacking multiple models
at the same time can improve the transferability of the gen-
erated adversarial examples. It is due to that if an example
remains adversarial for multiple models, it is more likely to
transfer to another black-box model.
We adopt the ensemble method proposed in [7], which
fuses the logit activations of different models. We attack
the ensemble of Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, and Res-v2-152
with equal ensemble weights using FGSM, TI-FGSM, MI-
FGSM, TI-MI-FGSM, DIM, and TI-DIM respectively. We
also use the 15 × 15 Gaussian kernel in the translation-
invariant based attacks.
In Table 5, we show the results of black-box attacks
against the eight defenses. The proposed method also im-
proves the success rates across all experiments over the
baseline attacks. It should be noted that the adversarial ex-
amples generated by TI-DIM can fool the state-of-the-art
defenses at an 82% success rate on average based on the
transferability. And the adversarial examples are generated
for normally trained models unaware of the defense strate-
gies. The results in the paper demonstrate that the current
defenses are far from real security, and cannot be deployed
in real-world applications.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a translation-invariant attack
method to generate adversarial examples that are less sen-
sitive to the discriminative regions of the white-box model
being attacked, and have higher transferability against the
defense models. Our method optimizes an adversarial im-
age by using a set of translated images. Based on an as-
sumption, our method is efficiently implemented by con-
volving the gradient with a pre-defined kernel, and can be
integrated into any gradient-based attack method. We con-
ducted experiments to validate the effectiveness of the pro-
posed method. Our best attack, TI-DIM, the combination
of the proposed translation-invariant method and diverse in-
puts method [38], can fool eight state-of-the-art defenses
at an 82% success rate on average, where the adversar-
ial examples are generated against four normally trained
models. The results identify the vulnerability of the cur-
rent defenses, and thus raise security issues for the develop-
ment of more robust deep learning models. We make our
codes public at https://github.com/dongyp13/
Translation-Invariant-Attacks.
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Appendix
We first show the results of the proposed translation-
invariant attack method for white-box attacks and black-
box attacks against normally trained models. We adopt
the same settings for attacks. We also generate adversar-
ial examples for Inception v3 (Inc-v3) [32], Inception v4
(Inc-v4), Inception ResNet v2 (IncRes-v2) [31], and ResNet
v2-152 (Res-v2-152) [13], respectively, using FGSM, TI-
FGSM, MI-FGSM, TI-MI-FGSM, DIM, and TI-DIM. For
the translation-invariant based attacks, we use the 7 × 7
Gaussian kernel, since that the normally trained models
have similar discriminative regions. We then use these ad-
versarial examples to attack six normally trained models—
Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, Res-v2-152, VGG-16 [29], and
Res-v1-152 [12]. The results are shown in Table 6 for
FGSM and TI-FGSM, Table 7 for MI-FGSM and TI-MI-
FGSM, and Table 8 for DIM and TI-DIM. The translation-
invariant based attacks get better results in most cases than
the baseline attacks.
Moreover, the experiments above and in the main paper
are conducted based on the L∞ norm bound. We further
demonstrate the applicability of the proposed method for
other norm bounds, especially the L2 norm bound. Similar
to the results in Table 2-5, we present the results of FGSM
and TI-FGSM in Table 9, MI-FGSM and TI-MI-FGSM in
Table 10, DIM and TI-DIM in Table 11, and the ensemble
method in Table 12. All those results are based on the L2
norm bound, and we set the maximum perturbation  = 10 ·√
d, where d is the dimension of input images. The results
based on the L2 norm bound also show the effectiveness of
the proposed method.
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Attack Inc-v3 Inc-v4 IncRes-v2 Res-v2-152 VGG-16 Res-v1-152
Inc-v3 FGSM 79.6* 35.9 30.6 30.2 49.7 36.3TI-FGSM 75.4* 37.3 32.1 34.1 62.0 44.9
Inc-v4 FGSM 43.1 72.6* 32.5 34.3 50.7 37.7TI-FGSM 45.3 68.1* 33.7 35.4 63.3 46.2
IncRes-v2 FGSM 44.3 36.1 64.3* 31.9 49.4 38.6TI-FGSM 49.7 41.5 63.7* 40.1 64.2 46.7
Res-v2-152 FGSM 40.1 34.0 30.3 81.3* 50.5 40.8TI-FGSM 46.4 39.3 33.4 78.9* 64.7 50.4
Table 6. The success rates (%) of adversarial attacks against six normally trained models—Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, Res-v2-152, VGG-
16, and Res-v1-152. The adversarial examples are crafted for Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, and Res-v2-152, respectively, using FGSM and
TI-FGSM. * indicates the white-box attacks.
Attack Inc-v3 Inc-v4 IncRes-v2 Res-v2-152 VGG-16 Res-v1-152
Inc-v3 MI-FGSM 97.8* 47.1 46.4 38.7 50.3 38.1TI-MI-FGSM 97.9* 52.4 47.9 41.1 63.4 48.1
Inc-v4 MI-FGSM 67.1 98.8* 54.3 47.0 58.5 43.2TI-MI-FGSM 68.6 98.8* 55.3 47.7 69.0 51.3
IncRes-v2 MI-FGSM 74.8 64.8 100.0* 54.5 59.3 50.8TI-MI-FGSM 76.1 69.5 100.0* 59.6 74.4 61.5
Res-v2-152 MI-FGSM 54.2 48.1 44.3 97.5* 52.6 48.7TI-MI-FGSM 55.6 50.9 45.1 97.4* 65.6 59.6
Table 7. The success rates (%) of adversarial attacks against six normally trained models—Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, Res-v2-152, VGG-
16, and Res-v1-152. The adversarial examples are crafted for Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, and Res-v2-152, respectively, using MI-FGSM
and TI-MI-FGSM. * indicates the white-box attacks.
Attack Inc-v3 Inc-v4 IncRes-v2 Res-v2-152 VGG-16 Res-v1-152
Inc-v3 DIM 98.3* 73.8 67.8 58.4 62.5 49.3TI-DIM 98.5* 75.2 69.2 59.0 74.3 59.1
Inc-v4 DIM 81.8 98.2* 74.2 65.1 65.5 51.4TI-DIM 80.7 98.7* 73.2 62.7 77.4 59.8
IncRes-v2 DIM 86.1 83.5 99.1* 73.5 67.9 62.7TI-DIM 86.4 85.5 98.8* 76.3 79.3 72.2
Res-v2-152 DIM 77.0 77.8 73.5 97.4* 67.4 67.8TI-DIM 77.0 73.9 73.2 97.2* 78.4 77.8
Table 8. The success rates (%) of adversarial attacks against six normally trained models—Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, Res-v2-152, VGG-
16, and Res-v1-152. The adversarial examples are crafted for Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, and Res-v2-152, respectively, using DIM and
TI-DIM. * indicates the white-box attacks.
Attack Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens HGD R&P JPEG TVM NIPS-r3
Inc-v3 FGSM 13.7 14.5 6.8 6.0 6.1 10.9 22.0 8.2TI-FGSM 15.2 15.7 10.2 8.2 18.8 11.0 25.7 10.4
Inc-v4 FGSM 13.9 15.0 8.2 8.3 7.4 11.5 22.2 8.5TI-FGSM 13.9 16.2 10.4 8.0 9.1 11.3 24.3 8.9
IncRes-v2 FGSM 16.0 17.5 11.3 10.8 10.2 14.4 26.2 11.6TI-FGSM 18.1 18.5 15.5 12.3 13.2 14.7 29.4 13.6
Res-v2-152 FGSM 12.7 15.1 8.1 7.0 7.1 10.2 20.3 8.2TI-FGSM 13.4 15.8 9.7 7.2 7.9 10.7 22.5 9.1
Table 9. The success rates (%) of black-box attacks against eight defenses based on the L2 norm bound. The adversarial examples are
crafted for Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, and Res-v2-152 respectively using FGSM and TI-FGSM.
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Attack Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens HGD R&P JPEG TVM NIPS-r3
Inc-v3 MI-FGSM 15.9 16.3 7.0 7.8 7.5 12.8 15.7 8.4TI-MI-FGSM 22.8 24.6 14.8 14.0 13.0 15.8 22.7 15.1
Inc-v4 MI-FGSM 18.1 18.7 8.3 9.3 9.0 14.9 17.5 10.7TI-MI-FGSM 24.3 25.5 27.9 15.7 15.9 29.0 25.2 16.5
IncRes-v2 MI-FGSM 22.9 21.6 16.6 17.1 15.2 22.2 20.9 18.0TI-MI-FGSM 35.0 35.8 30.5 26.3 26.4 29.8 35.6 28.8
Res-v2-152 MI-FGSM 18.6 18.7 10.4 12.4 10.8 14.9 15.9 11.1TI-MI-FGSM 21.6 23.3 17.3 15.1 15.6 18.7 24.6 17.6
Table 10. The success rates (%) of black-box attacks against eight defenses based on the L2 norm bound. The adversarial examples are
crafted for Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, and Res-v2-152 respectively using MI-FGSM and TI-MI-FGSM.
Attack Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens HGD R&P JPEG TVM NIPS-r3
Inc-v3 DIM 17.9 21.8 9.7 11.8 10.0 15.5 17.0 12.7TI-DIM 29.6 31.9 22.0 20.1 20.0 22.0 27.3 23.9
Inc-v4 DIM 21.6 22.2 12.9 15.8 13.3 20.5 19.2 16.6TI-DIM 31.0 33.1 24.0 22.8 22.9 24.8 29.2 25.1
IncRes-v2 DIM 34.5 31.0 23.8 27.0 25.8 31.5 25.0 26.9TI-DIM 43.3 45.2 42.4 39.3 42.7 42.2 43.3 41.2
Res-v2-152 DIM 29.0 30.1 18.7 27.8 19.8 26.7 21.3 23.1TI-DIM 36.3 37.2 28.9 28.0 30.0 28.4 36.1 32.7
Table 11. The success rates (%) of black-box attacks against eight defenses based on the L2 norm bound. The adversarial examples are
crafted for Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, and Res-v2-152 respectively using DIM and TI-DIM.
Attack Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens HGD R&P JPEG TVM NIPS-r3
FGSM 26.6 27.3 16.0 18.1 16.5 21.1 23.7 17.9
TI-FGSM 26.1 26.7 19.2 17.1 19.1 20.0 27.2 19.1
MI-FGSM 44.3 42.8 27.2 40.7 28.1 43.6 30.8 34.4
TI-MI-FGSM 59.3 59.0 53.0 54.6 50.0 53.3 51.3 51.1
DIM 57.0 54.7 37.4 58.9 43.4 60.3 37.3 50.3
TI-DIM 66.9 66.0 60.4 63.2 62.9 58.4 58.4 62.7
Table 12. The success rates (%) of black-box attacks against eight defenses based on the L2 norm bound. The adversarial examples are
crafted for the ensemble of Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, and Res-v2-152 using FGSM, TI-FGSM, MI-FGSM, TI-MI-FGSM, DIM, and
TI-DIM.
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